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Bargaining Approacht
Foreign nations are not yet considered as
objects susceptible of an injury.
Jeremy Bentham
Geneva is a long way from Havana. The physical distance separating the
two cities symbolizes the philosophic gap between the Havana Charter of
1948 and the UNCTAD Final Act of 1964. Yet the modern commodity
agreements-and much of the controversy that presently surrounds
them-were born in Havana and Geneva.
Commodity agreements have been recognized internationally since the
World Economic Conference in 1927; they even have nineteenth century
antecedents.' Nevertheless, it was not until the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Employment promulgated the Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization (ITO), that there was anything approach-
ing an "international law" of commodity agreements. The ITO aborted;
but Chapter VI of its Charter, dealing with inter-governmental commodity
agreements, was adopted in 1951 by a resolution of the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC).
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1In 1864, for example, four European countries entered into a ten year agreement to do
away with beet sugar production bonuses and export subsidies. WILLIAM E. HAVILAND,
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS (Montreal: Private Planning Association of Ca-
nada, 1963), p. 16. Generally, inter-governmental agreements succeeded private cartel ar-
rangements and national valorization or price supporting schemes. EDWARD S. MASON,
CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), p. 152.2 Resolution 373 (XIII), Sept. 13, 195 1, cited by Herman Walker, The International Law
of Commodity Agreements, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol. 28 (Spring, 1963), p.
401. But, strictly speaking, Chapter VI never became law. It has had only a "hortatory
status." Id., at 414.
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The significance of Chapter VI lay in its restrictive endorsement of
inter-governmental agreements: commodity control was a "necessary evil,"
for temporary use and limited objectives.3 Not only were such agreements
not to exceed an initial period of five years, but their operations were
confined to surplus disposals and price stabilization. Significantly, the
Charter provided an equal voice for importing countries in order to
safeguard consumers "against producer-cartel exactions." 4 The philosophic
norm of the Havana draftsmen was free trade.
In 1948 ECOSOC had established the Interim Coordinating Committee
for International Commodity Agreements (ICCICA). Evan after the ITO
proposal failed, ICCICA promoted the commodity principles of the Ha-
vana Charter.5 At least until the Coffee Agreement of 1962, ICCICA and
the Committee on International Commodity Trade (CICT), established in
1954, preserved the spirit of Havana. Indeed, the paucity of agreements
reached under Chapter VI guidelines testifies to their success.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UN-
CTAD) met in Geneva in the spring of 1964. More than 2,000 delegates
from 120 countries spent three months debating trade problems. An entire
volume of the printed Proceedings (numbering eight volumes) was devoted
to commodity trade. When compared to its Havana predecessor, UN-
CTAD marked a complete turnabout. No longer were the main issues
simply "burdensome surpluses" or price fluctuations. At UNCTAD the
less-developed countries (LDCs) called the tune. And the melody bore
little resemblance to the soft strains heard at Havana. In short, the LDCs
mounted a well-coordinated assault on the citadel of free trade.
The most significant proposals put forth by the seventy-seven poor
nations called for broader access to the markets of the industrial North,
preferential arrangements for LDC manufactures, and the use of com-
modity agreements to increase producer incomes as well as to stabilize
prices. Finding a logical parallel in the national price support programs, the
UNCTAD majority moved from price stabilization to price augmentation. 6
Here was a mighty effort to prick the conscience of the rich.
If success can be measured by the quantity of ink poured out in scholar-
3J.W.F. ROWE, PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University, 1965), at 160; Stanley D. Metzger, Law and Policy Making for Trade
among "Have" and "Have-Not" Nations, LAW AND POLICY MAKING FOR TRADE AMONG
'HAVE' AND 'HAVE-NOT' NATIONS, ed. John Carey (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana, 1968), p. 16.4Walker, LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol. 28 (Spring, 1963), p. 414.5E.M.Ojala, Some Current Issues of International Commodity Policy, JOURNAL OF
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Vol. 18 (January, 1967), p. 39.
6UNCTAD defined the "new" commodity agreement objectives as follows:
"... stimulating a dynamic and steady growth and ensuring reasonable predictability in
the real export earnings of the developing countries so as to provide them with expanding
resources for their economic and social development, while taking into account the
interests of consumers in importing countries, through remunerative, equitable and stable
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ly debate of the new commodity policy, UNCTAD indeed succeeded.
Books and articles on trade policies toward less developed countries pro-
liferated after 1964. 7 If political embarrassment of the developed countries,
particularly the United States, is a measure, UNCTAD's was a double
success. The American representatives voted against almost every major
proposal.8 But if the criterion is translation of policy declarations into
practice, UNCTAD worked no revolution. Indeed, the recent departure of
Dr. Raul Prebisch, mentor of the Conference, may be a reflection of the
group's continued frustration.9
What accounts for UNCTAD's rise-and apparent decline? With regard
to international commodity agreements, what is the response of the profes-
sional economists? Where can the LDCs go from here?
The answer to the first question lies in the times. Development econom-
ics was not a recognized science in 1948; nor did the LDCs have a
coherent trade doctrine to bring to Havana. Most of the present poor
nations were then colonies or only recently independent. But with the
Marshall Plan came the notion of planned development.' 0 And with the
independence movement in Africa and Asia came the consciousness of
underdevelopment.
Commodity surpluses and a declining price-trend following the Korean
War coincided with a stagnating import substitution policy in Latin Amer-
ica, and general impatience with the tariff barriers in the developed world.
Added to this was a realization that the gap between rich and poor coun-
tries was growing, even in the midst of a "Development Decade." Regional
associations like the Common Market posed a threat, while the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) offered no practical help.
UNCTAD exposed the duplicity of the free trade dogma as it was
applied in practice; the Conference challenged the developed countries to
pursue a trade policy consistent with the goals of economic development.
UNCTAD's decline since 1964 simply mirrors the failure of the industrial
nations to meet that challenge.
Professional economists have responded profusely to the commodity
agreement proposals of UNCTAD. Indeed they have disagreed among
prices for primary commodities, having due regard to their import purchasing power,
assured satisfactory access and increased imports and consumption, as well as coordina-
tion of production and marketing policies." UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS: FINAL ACT AND
REPORT, Vol. I (New York: United Nations, 1964), p. 12.
I 7See, in particular, JOHN PINCUS, TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT (New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1967), and Harry G. Johnson, ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD LESS DEVEL-
OPED COUNTRIES (New York: Praeger, 1967).
8Johnson, Economic Policies, at 25 1 - 54.
9The New York Times, March 10, 1969, at 19.
101. M. D. LITTLE and J.M. CLIFFORD, INTERNATIONAL AID (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), at
24.
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themselves to a considerable extent. Even such underlying factors as the
nature and relevance of export instability, the declining terms of trade, and
the kinds of commodities amenable to agreement are hotly disputed in the
literature." For the most part, American and British economists have
denounced the commodity agreement as an instrument of trade policy.
Professor Rowe's attack is not untypical:
If the politicians of consuming countries accept the doctrine of trade at
artificially high prices as preached by the politicians of underdeveloped coun-
tries for their primary products, then economists everywhere should shout,
and for once can do so with one voice, that this policy is bound to lead to the
waste and misuse of the world's limited resources, and cannot maximize the
world's wealth. 12
Perhaps because of the economists' traditional repugnance to monopoly
pricing and quota restrictions, most of the attention to commodity prob-
lems in underdeveloped countries focuses upon alternatives to
price-supporting agreements. After reciting the litancy of evils associated
with international commodity agreements, the analyst usually addresses
himself to the trading plight of the LDCs.
What should be done to narrow the gap? Here there is no want of fertile
suggestions: compensatory finance, more aid, an international reserve cur-
rency, removal of Northern tariff barriers, internal reforms in the LDCs.
Thus it is said that commodity agreements "are marginal at best in their
positive effects upon development," and the developing countries should
instead:
devote their energies, collectively, to securing greater amounts of foreign aid
(directly and through compensatory financing) and dismantling of protection-
ism by developed countries, and individually, to internal societal transforma-
tions at home. 13
Consequently, the question of improving and expanding the commodity
agreement hardly appears in the literature.' 4
"For example, on export instability, contrast ALASDAIR 1. MACBEAN, EXPORT IN-
STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 339
with GUNNAR MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968)
Vol. 3, at 2190. On the declining terms of trade, contrast RAUL PREBISCH, TOWARDS A NEW
TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT (New York: United Nations, 1964), at 15 with Johnson,
Economic Policies, at 249- 50. On the types of commodities suitable for agreements, contrast
John A. Pincus, What Policy for Commodities? READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS, eds. Finn B. Jensen and Ingo Walter (New York: Ronald, 1966), at 459-60 with
Gerda Blau, International Commodity Arrangements and .Policies, UNCTAD, PROCEED-
INGS: COMMODITY TRADE, Vol. III (New York: United Nations, 1964), at 150.
12Rowe, Primary Commodities, at 215- 16.
13Metzger, Law and Policy Making, at 39.
'
4 Surprisingly, even the UNCTAD volume on commodity trade (PROCEEDINGS, Vol.
Ill) devoted little attention to innovative possibilities, especially in the procedural and struc-
tural aspects. Dr. Blau's paper, supra, note I1, is probably the most sensitive to these issues.
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There is, it would seem, substantial basis to challenge the conventional
wisdom. For the economists' pleas for increased aid and the lowering of
tariff barriers have generally met with inaction by the developed nations.
Furthermore, the continuance of agricultural price supports in the United
States and other countries appears either as a rebuke to economic theory
or as another example of Northern hypocrisy. Almost at every turn politi-
cal reality thwarts economic rationality. In a world of second best, is there
a place for UNCTAD-type commodity agreements? And if so, how can
they be made more effective?
I. The Commodity Problem
The commodity problem has two sides: instability and the declining
terms of trade. Their importance to the developing countries can be seen in
the following statements:
(1) Exports of primary products account for some 85-90 per cent. of
the total export earnings of the LDCs.15
(2) Based on 1959-61 figures, primary products account for approxi-
mately 45 per cent. of the total world exports. 16
(3) In 1962, twenty-one LDCs depended upon a single commodity for
50 per cent. or more of their export earnings.' 7
What is evident from these statistics is the vulnerability of many devel-
oping countries to market fluctuations and a downward price trend. The
harmful effects of market fluctuation upon a developing economy are gen-
erally conceded. The corresponding instability in employment and incomes
undermines sound fiscal policy.
Fear of restrictions on the transfer of funds abroad inhibits capital
investment of foreign firms. Market fluctuation causes irregularities in the
flow of imports and investment goods. Domestic savings and investment
are deterred. The instability phenomenon tends to reduce the cred-
it-worthiness of the country in the eyes of foreign lenders. Planning for
development becomes generally difficult and hazardous.' 8
The initial question is whether in fact commodity instability threatens
the growth of the LDCs. Some recent empirical studies have cast doubt on
the instability argument. Alasdair MacBean presents the strongest case,
15Johnson, Economic Policies, at 136,16Rowe, Primary Commodities, at 2. Furthermore, competition between the Atlantic
Community and the LDCs is a "major factor in world commodity trade." PINCUS, TRADE AID
AND DEVELOPMENT, at 235.
17See LITTLE and CLIFFORD, INTERNATIONAL AID, at 156.
'
8ECOSOC, "International Commodity Problems," UNCTAD, PROCEEDINGS: COM-
MODITY TRADE, Vol. I11, p. 110; Rowe, Primary Commodities, p. 217.
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concluding that (1) the importance of short term instability to under-
developed countries is exaggerated; (2) there is little evidence to show that
their economies have been damaged by such instability; and (3) fluctua-
tions in income are not clearly related to fluctuations in export earnings. 19
Another writer, studying the Chilean economy, found no clear relation-
ship between the stability of export earnings and growth. 20 Nevertheless,
several economists have emphasized the effect of price fluctuations on
plantings, especially treee crops. 21 Referring indirectly to the MacBean
thesis, a recent observer argued:
One's conclusions with respect to the instability in export proceeds depend
very much on the statistical method selected to correct for trends, on the
coverage of countries and commodities, and on the time period examined. 22
In particular, the revenues of the LDCs which depend upon a few
commodity exports for a large percentage of their GNP would seem to be
at the mercy of the market, regardless of the predictions of aggregate
analysis. 23
The term "stabilization" has been variously interpreted. What is to be
stabilized? Any of the following may be subject to anti-fluctuation policy: 24
(1) the international price of an export commodity;
(2) producers' money income or real income;
(3) export earnings;
(4) the purchasing power of primary product exports.
It is recognized that stabilization of one of these elements (price, for
example) may destabilize another variable (export earnings). 25 While the
commodity agreement guidelines of the Havana Charter were limited to
price stabilization, the UNCTAD proposals were directed to income and
earnings objectives.
19 MACBEAN, EXPORT INSTABILITY, p. 339.20Clark W. Reynolds, Domestic Consequences of Export Instability, AMERICAN Eco-
NOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 53 (May, 1963), p. 100.21See for example, PINCUS, TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT, pp. 285, 293.22Gerald M. Meier, UNCTAD Proposals for International Economic Reform, STAN-
FORD LAW REVIEW, Vol. 19 (June, 1967), p. 1185.
231d., at 1186; LITTLE and CLIFFORD, INTERNATIONAL All), at 155; Haviland, Inter-
national Commodity Agreements, p. 52; Professor Myrdal states the case succinctly:
"The basic causes of export instability and the reasons it is so significant lie essentially in
the nature of underdevelopment itself. Underdeveloped countries have only a limited
ability to adjust supply to demand, an export list composed of one or a few major
products, often a relatively high ratio of exports to national income, and a rapidly
growing total of import needs; thus they are sensitive and extremely vulnerable to
variations in export proceeds." Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. III, p. 2200.
24Meier, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, Vol. 19 (June, 1967), p. 1195.
251bid.
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Sources of instability may be found on both supply and demand sides.
For convenience, these destabilizing factors may be arranged in parallel
columns.2 6
Supply Variables Demand Variables
(1) Political crises, wars. (1) Political crises, wars.
(2) Business cycle. (2) Business cycle.
(3) Subsidies, export policy. (3) Protection, import policy.
(4) Surpluses and disposal. (4) Stockpiling and disposal.
(5) Market information. (5) Speculation.
(6) Shipping rates. (6) Synthetics, substitutes.





(11) Crop production cycles.
(12) Discovery of new resources.
As the list suggests, supply variations, especially for agricultural com-
modities, are usually more important than fluctuations on the demand side.
This is largely explained by the relative insensitivity of agricultural output
to price, and the fact that once resources are expanded they are difficult to
contract. 2
7
Of even greater significance than instability to the LDCs is the down-
ward price trend. The so-called "declining terms of trade" thesis were a
predominant influence on the UNCTAD commodity proposals. 28 Exam-
ining the post-Korean War period, John Pincus estimates that the terms of
trade of the developing countries declined "by about 5 per cent. for the
period 1952/53-1964," notwithstanding a recovery during the last two
years. 29 Elsewhere he traces the reasons for the secular decline.30
First, Engel's Law: the tendency in high income countries for demand
for food to increase more slowly than income. Second, the increasing
recourse to commodity substitutes and synthetics, as well as technological
26 Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, pp. 41 -43; Myrdal, Asian Drama,
Vol. 111, p. 2193; L. Baranyai and J.C. Mills, International Commodity Agreements (Mexico
City: Centro De Estudio Monetarios Latino Americanos, 1963), p. 11; Dragoslav Avaramov-
ic, Economic Growth and External Debt (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1964), p. 14.27Mason, Controlling World Trade, p. 141.28 Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, at 2.29 Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, at 234.
30 Pincus, Readings in International Economic Relations, at 455.
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advances requiring fewer raw materials. Third, the supply of many prod-
ucts was stimulated during the Korean War, thus leading to chronic
over-supply. Finally, for some poor countries there is no ready alternative
to continued production of traditional commodities.
The last point is particularly important in view of repeated exhortations
for developing countries to pursue diversification policy instead of com-
modity agreements. The fact of the matter is that the ability to diversify
often depends upon a level of economic development which many coun-
tries have not yet reached. 31 As noted below, the incapacity to diversify is
a formidable objection to the efficiency arguments of the economic theorist
attacking commodity agreements.
A striking example of the severity of commodity price decline is that of
coffee. According to Dr. Avramovic, the coffee countries produced and
sold in 1962 a quantity which was 50 per cent. greater than in 1954. Yet
their exchange earnings in 1962 were one-third smaller than eight years
earlier.3 2
The supply side variables should not obscure the difficulties stemming
from countries which preach free trade while practicing protection. The
Atlantic countries commonly place restrictive tariffs upon imports of tem-
perate agricultural products (including such competing products as sugar,
oilseeds, cotton and citrus), as well as minerals which compete with domes-
tic production.33 In addition, one may discover in the trade practices of the
developed countries quantitative limitations on imports, excise or other
internal taxes, and preferential trade arrangements.3 4
Referring to national price support schemes in industrial countries,
ECOSOC found that they "have adversely affected the stability of the
world market."3 5 In other words, the same countries that attack in-
ternational commodity agreements use the world market as a safety valve
for their own support or stabilization operations. 3 6 Even before the UN-
CTAD gathering, the Economist described the trade crisis of the third
world in these terms:
The underdeveloped countries, poor as they are, have been contributing,
involuntarily, to western prosperity. Since the early 'fifties the volume of food
and agricultural products exported has risen by about a third. But in value
they have increased by only a sixth and the rise in the price of manufactures
has wiped out even that small gain.3 7
31ECOSOC, UNCTAD Proceedings: Commodity Trade, Vol. I1, at. 83.32Avramovic, Economic Growth, at 17.33pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, p. 124.341d., at 259.35ECOSOC, UNCTAD Proceedings: Commodity Trade, Vol. III, at 93.
361d., at 81.37The Economist, January 12, 1963, at 131.
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II. The ICA Solution 38
No one (including UNCTAD) contends that international commodity
agreements can solve all the trade problems of developing countries. The
disagreement is over potential net gains or losses.
As seen by the developing countries at Geneva, commodity agreements
should serve three main purposes:
(1) to raise, or at least prevent declines in, prices;
(2) to diminish fluctuations in prices and earnings; and
(3) to guarantee market access for specified quantities
as a method of counteracting protectionism in importing countries.
39
In addition, Dr. Blau has viewed ICAs as "instruments for in-
tergovernmental commodity programming on more comprehensive
lines." 40 Clearly, these objectives go far beyond the Havana Charter guide-
lines. Notwithstanding the declared policy of maintaining "equitable
prices" in the Wheat and Coffee Agreements, and "adequate" or "reason-
able" returns to producers in the Sugar and Tin Agreements, the UN-
CTAD goals exceed the stated objectives of the five agreements operative
in 1964.41
More important than the declaration of purpose are the means chosen to
stabilize or augment prices or earnings. Prices, production, exports and
stocks are the available points of access for governmental intervention'
2
Thus, in the existing agreements, three principal control devices are used,
separately or in combination.
Under the multilateral contract mechanism of the Wheat Agreement a
permissible price range is specified. Above the maximum, the producing
countries are obligated to sell stipulated quantities to consuming countries
at the maximum price. Below the minimum, consuming countries are obli-
gated to purchase stipulated quantities from producing countries at the
minimum price.
Buffer stock is a second control mechanism. As applied in the Tin
Agreement, member countries contribute either stocks or cash to a central
38An international commodity agreement (ICA) has been defined as "an association of
the governments of more than two countries for the purpose of regulating the marketing of
some primary product in the interests of exporters and importers." Haviland, International
Commodity Agreements, p. 9. Professor Mason has shown that ICAs may serve such diverse
ends as providing equitable access to scarce strategic materials and safeguards to health and
morals (e.g., regulation of the opium trade), and may include bulk purchase agreements, barter
deals and import quotas of one government to another. Mason, Controlling World Trade, pp.
149, 151. For the purpose of this article, these latter types of agreement, as well as com-
pensatory finance agreements, are not included in the ICA device.
3 9Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, at 267.4 0 Blau, UNCTAD Proceedings: Commodity Trade, Vol. III, at 141, 166.
41See Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, at 10- I1, 14- 15, 17, 20-22.
42 Mason, Controlling World Trade, at 143.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
318 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
fund. When the price exceeds or falls below a specified range, the manager
of the buffer stock will attempt to restore price stability by buying or selling
on the open market.
Finally, there are export quotas, on which reliance is placed in the
Sugar, Tin and Coffee Agreements. The quota device seeks simply to raise
the price by restricting supply.
Imbued with the free trade spirit of Havana, most economists have
reacted unfavorably to international commodity agreements. Conceding
that buffer stock and multilateral contracts are less likely to distort
efficiency factors, 43 they usually focus their attack upon quota restric-
tions.44 The catalogue of ideological objections is familiar and may be
summarized as follows: 45
(1) misallocation of resources;
(2) restriction of production;
(3) protection of inefficient producers.
Behind each of these objections is the efficiency criterion. Under mi-
cro-economic theory, monopoly pricing wastes economic resources, gener-
ates excess capacity, and leads to higher average costs than are tech-
nologically necessary. 46 Should effects upon efficiency be the sole measure-
ment of ICAs? Equally important, is the standard efficiency argument
applicable in the LDC context?
Efficiency is not the only economic goal. Growth, stability, and equitable
income distribution are also pursued in various fashion by modern so-
cieties. Yet the theoretical arguments against ICAs are almost solely on
efficiency grounds.
The efficiency argument itself is subject to some question. It is based on
the assumption that resources not used in the production of primary prod-
ucts will find employment elsewhere. While this may be true in complex
industrial societies, it is not necessarily so in poor countries. There the
capacity to diversify may depend upon further development. ECOSOC
recognized the problem:
If a persistent movement indicates the need for some structural adjustment,
43id., p. 221; Little and Clifford, International Aid, at 157; Johnson, Economic Policies,
at 146; MacBean, Export Instability, at 275-76.44There is at least an implicit recognition that buffer stock and multilateral contract
arrangements must ultimately be accompanied by some control of exports or production.
Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, at 42; MacBean, Export Instability, at
275 -76. For this reason perhaps, much of the economists' criticism falls on ICAs in general.
Id., at 273-74.
45Johnson, Economic Policies, at 147; Rowe, Primary Commodities, at 215; Pincus,
Trade, Aid and Development, at 293; Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, at 36;
Baranyai and Mills, International Commodity Agreements, at 29.46Robert Dorfman, The Price System (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), at 96.
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this may have to be approached in a more positive manner, with Govern-
ments actively assisting factors to move to more productive employment.
This poses particularly difficult problems in underdeveloped countries in
which alternative uses for resources may in the short run be very few and in
the longer run require a good deal of complementary investment.47
Considering the rigidity of many LDC economies, a government en-
forced production control scheme would seem to offer a more constructive
incentive for diversification than laissez-faire exhortations from abroad.
Thus a quota scheme may encourage a shifting of resources out of the area
of overproduction. 48 Furthermore, the Coffee Agreement shows that an
ICA itself may embody diversification policy.
ICA critics tend to argue from an ideal-world position. They invariably
neglect to explain, and often fail to mention, the substantial barriers to free
trade erected by the Northern countries. Moreover, the presence of domes-
tic agricultural price support programs gives rise to justifiable charges of
inconsistency and double standards. Even the "Metzger thesis" -that the
LDCs should give up their ICA proposals in order to concentrate on tariff
reduction 49 -is unencouraging, given the political forces presently in sup-
port of protection. On the Northern side, the policy imperatives are clear:
We must ... strive for compatability between what we do ourselves with
what we demand of others .... We must not say that there is a difference
because of our domestic supply controls, since these have in most cases been
of questionable effectiveness. 50
Meanwhile, protectionism in the developed countries persists. In a world
of second best, commodity agreements become economically defensible. 51
Failure to recognize monopoly elements in Northern trade leads to a
second misconception: that price-augmenting commodity agreements con-
stitute foreign aid. Indeed, the recent literature is replete with such descrip-
tions as "charity in disguise,' 52 "a highly arbitrary form of taxation," 53 and
47ECOSOC, UNCTAD Proceedings: Commodity Trade, Vol. 111, at 83.48Mason, Controlling World Trade, at 169-70.
49Metzger, Law and Policy Making, at 21; See also; Stanley D. Metzger, Developments
in the Law and Institutions of International Economic Relations, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 61 (July, 1967), p. 764.
50J.H.Richter, Agricultural Protection and Trade, (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 39.
51
"International commodity agreements are not ideally liberal, but they may be prefer-
able in practice to recurrent waves of protectionism or to cut-throat competition during
deflationary periods." Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, at 38. "In an imper-
fect world, imperfect policies intelligently applied may produce more desirable results than
theoretically perfect policies applied only in fragmentary fashion." Johnson, Economic Pol-
icies, at 42. See also Blau, UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS: COMMODITY TRADE, Vol. III, at 148.52 Rowe, Primary Commodities, p. 215.53Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, at 278; see also Raymond F. Mike-
sell, Commodity Agreements and Aid to Developing Countries, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS, Vol. 28 (Spring, 1963) at 296-97.
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"disguised aid." 54 But are the benefits accruing to producer countries under
an international commodity agreement really aid? As Professors Little and
Clifford agree, "aid" is an ambiguous word. 55 It is hard enough to extract
the aid element from some types of loans.
If consistency is a measure, however, it is significant that neither ICA
benefits accruing to developed producer countries (or to developed con-
sumer countries under the multi-lateral contract schemes), nor domestic
farmer price supports are commonly referred to as "aid." Furthermore,
ICA benefits may be distinguished from governmental grants in at least
three important respects: (1) except in compensating schemes, the burdens
fall on individual consumers, rather than governments; (2) Depending
upon the producing country's tax policy, the benefits accrue to individual
producers; and (3) especially in the production of raw materials, foreign
investors from the developed countries may benefit in the form of in-
creased profits.
The continuing tendency for the developed countries to extol free trade
as the norm, while violating it in practice makes such terms as "charity in
disguise" particularly inappropriate. For barriers to trade in the North
increase the instability of prices in that market and thus aggravate the
instability of export earnings from primary production.5 6 Indeed, the logic
behind the "disguised aid" terminology would support a "stolen aid" con-
cept in the case of restrictive trade policy. This point is implicit in a
statement attributed to the United States Secretary of State in 1961:
There is no sense whatever in taxing Americans for foreign aid if we mean-
while pursue trade policies which undermine the prospects for economic
development. It should be remembered that a drop of a few cents in world
commodity prices could wipe out any contribution we might make through
our aid in helping the underdeveloped country concerned. 57
Elimination of such value-charged terms as "charity in disguise" and the
like, would undoubtedly raise the level of ICA analysis.
When economists get through with their theoretical attacks on com-
modity agreements, they usually turn to administrative objections. Arguing
largely from past experience, they contend: 58
(1) that the commodities amenable to ICA control are limited to a
handful;
(2) negotiations are extraordinarily difficult; and
(3) breakdowns are frequent.
54See Johnson, Economic Policies, at 56- 57.
55 LITTLE and CLIFFORD, INTERNATIONAL AID, at 13.
56 Johnson, Economic Policies, at 84-85.
57Quoted in Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, at 6.58 Johnson, Economic Policies, p. 137; Pincus, Readings in International Economic
Relations, at 459-60; Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. I Ii, at 2194.
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Moreover, they claim, there is not enough revenue potential for developing
counties to make ICAs worthwhile.
Space does not permit a full examination of the administrative objec-
tions; it is sufficient to note that virtually no questioning of them has taken
place in the literature. If the prospects for additional agreements are so
dim, for example, it seems remarkable that at the time of UNCTAD
approximately one-forth of the basic commodities were subject at least to
consultative machinery. 59
Furthermore, Dr. Pincus' discounting of an estimated "$1 billion or so"
in additional export earnings from the ICAs, 60 is astounding when that
figure is compared to present aid flows. At a time when the real aid
commitment of the United States is less than $4 billion, and falling, $1
billion merits more than a shrug.
All of this is not to ignore the serious problems of substitutes, synthetics
and storage likely to be involved in commodity agreement policy. Rather it
is a plea for more constructive thinking; a recognition that the "case for
commodity agreements does not stand or fall on the measure of their
nearness to perfection."6 1 As one observer of commodity agreements re-
marked, "more than economics is involved." 62 The political hurdles are as
formidable as the economic ones. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to
devise a more effective method of negotiation.
III. A Collective Bargaining Approach
UNCTAD revealed a new international spirit as well as a fresh com-
modity policy. The poor countries presented a united front at Geneva.6 3
According to Professor Johnson, "they succeeded in maintaining the prin-
ciple of presenting agreed resolutions jointly, even on issues on which their
interests were fundamentally at variance . 6.. ,,64 Here then, is a potential
political base for commodity strategy.
In the power context of international trade, individual producer coun-
tries operate at a disadvantage. In most cases they are not only out-
numbered by consumers, but enter Commodity Conferences with substan-
tial differences among themselves. Under the Havana principle of equality
between importer and exporter groups, it is not surprising that the LDCs
are reduced to simple pleas for Northern largesse. With Southern requests
59Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, at 9.
"OPincus, Trade, Aid and Development, at 273.
61Robert Z. Aliber, Policy and International Commodity Stabilization-Discussion,
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 53 (May, 1963), at 104-05.62Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, at 33.
6Ojala, JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Vol. 18 (January, 1967), p. 39.64Johnson, Economic Policies, at 34.
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for freer trade and more aid falling on deaf ears, a more realistic approach
would seem to be warranted.6 5 UNCTAD offers an inspiration and GATT
a model for what might be termed a "collective bargaining" approach.
Resorting to analogy, one might compare the bargaining position of
individual LDCs to individual workers in the industrial state. Both share
political impotence. But the comparison may be carried a step further. Just
as the labor unions were able to raise the bargaining power of workers to
the level of management, a "commodity union" could strengthen the hand
of underdeveloped producer countries. Dr. Princus has argued that "to use
its new majorities to its own best interest" the LDCs will "have to resort
to statesmanship-a clear-eyed view for the realities of power ... "66
Accordingly, he calls for "realistic and unremitting pressure on the
North." 67 A "union," so-called, would provide such pressure through le-
gitimate institutional channels.
The "commodity union" idea is to build upon UNCTAD unity in the
negotiation and maintenance of commodity agreements. In theory, the
purpose of the union would be to exploit the monopoly power of the
producer countries. Despite its Hobbesian overtones, such a statement of
intent is neither sinister nor cynical, It is instead an appropriate and
politically rational response to protectionism and apathy in the developed
countries. Furthermore, in practice such "exploitation" of monopoly power
would be moderated by consumer power, economic realities (e.g., the
threat of substitutes and synthetics), and differences among the producer
countries necessitating compromise.
At least two important goals could be approached through commodity
unions. First, expansion of the commodities covered by international
agreement; and second, more favorable terms for the LDCs, especially
price augmentation. But how would a union function? What would be its
advantages?
A commodity union would "organize" all or most of the major LDC
producers of a primary product, such as cocoa. As in UNCTAD the
countries would meet in closed session until a bargaining position (or range
of positions) acceptable to all was struck. In most cases, of course, agree-
ment among producing countries large and small would not be a simple
matter.
Nevertheless, at this point negotiation would be facilitated by the small-
6"The North ... has already decided, not deliberately, but by the play of events, what
degree of 'cooperation' serves its political interests and its sense of justice, in light of other
goals. From this point on, barring dramatic political changes, the South cannot look to
increases in Northern largesse." Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, at 350.
661d., at 373.67Ibid.
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ness of the group, the absence of consumer interests, and the underlying
LDC unity. The union members would seek to initiate a common policy
proposal for presentation at a Commodity Conference. Collective support
and initiative advantage would enhance LDC bargaining strength and in-
crease the pressure for enlarged commodity coverage.
What should be clear thus far is that the union proposal requires no
disruption of formal procedures. The normal prerequisite to the formation
of a Commodity Conference is a Study Group.68 Under ECOSOC Resolu-
tion 296 (XI) a Commodity Conference may be requested by an in-
ter-governmental body, the Committee (ICCICA) then satisfying itself that
an agreement is possible and that adequate preparation has been made.6 9
Presumably there would be no objection to a request for a Conference
which came directly from a commodity union or, in the alternative, from a
Study Group initiated by a union.
A commodity union might be organized on any number of lines. GATT
provides one working model. 70 As the General Agreement offers a forum
for multilateral tariff negotiations, the union would facilitate negotiation of
such ICA questions as quotas and market access. GATT studies trends in
international trade; the union would do likewise with respect to its particu-
lar commodity, while serving as a spokesman for the LDC producers.
Finally, as in GATT, there would be some mechanism for settlement of
disputes and for sanctions. As Mancur Olson has shown, rational,
self-interested parties cannot ordinarily be counted on to act in their com-
mon interest.71
Among other possible advantages, a union could provide international
(i.e., joint LDC) supervision of quotas. This would relieve somewhat the
political pressure upon the individual governments. A union would also
have an opportunity to advance such LDC policies as diversification and a
two-price system; it would be an ideal coordinator for all policies not
necessarily involving the industrial nations.
With regard to the Commodity Conference itself, the union would
present one immediate advantage: a single bargaining unit as opposed to
many. As one student of the negotiation process has observed:
A group position is more likely to win than an individual position because of
the greater power and resources behind it, because of its greater moral
legitimacy (one's cause seems more 'right' when others support it), and
6 8 ICCICA, Inter-Governmental Commodity Agreements, UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS:
COMMODITY TRADE, Vol. IlII (New York: United Nations, 1964), at 115.691d., at 114.
7OCf., Johnson, Economic Policies, at 14.71Mancur Olson, Jr., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge; Harvard Univer-
sity, 1965), at 2.
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because it is more likely to be a moderate and general position (hence more
amenable to accommodation). 72
It is true, however, that "when individual goals are partly forsaken in
generalizing to a group position, individual dissatisfaction is increased." 73
But the task of the union would be to reach a workable compromise and
to maintain it by the fair distribution of rewards and, when necessary, by
sanctions. A single negotiating agent (individual or committee) would ease
the work of the Conference and sharpen the sword of the LDC producers.
Once it resolved its internal differences, a union could chart a strategy
for securing an agreement with its importing countries. This might involve,
for example, a public relations campaign, the enlisting of support from
foreign investors engaged in commodity production, or even temporary
alliance with Northern protectionists who favor increases in LDC export
prices to the level of domestic prices in the developed countries.74 Further-
more, the desire of the "industrial system" for price and supply certainty,
through long-term contracts, offers potential support for the multilateral
contract mechanism. 75
The possible drawbacks to the union are first, that it won't work: that
member countries would either fail to agree or neglect to abide by an
agreement; and second, that the consuming countries would organize a
retaliatory union.76 Both negative possibilities are of course quite real.
UNCTAD is the best, but not conclusive, argument against the former
objection. As Professor Johnson says, it was successful in demonstrating
LDC capacity "to organize and conduct themselves as a cohesive political
group in opposition to the developed countries." 77
The prospect for a retaliatory organization by the developed countries is
lessened by two factors: concern for world opinion, especially in the cold
war context; and the fact that consumer interests carry less political weight
than producer interests in their respective countries. 78 In any event, a
commodity union could be whatever the LDC producers wished it to be;
flexibility, low costs, and potential effectiveness are its principal strengths.
72 Lillian Randolph, A Suggested Model of International Negotiation, THE JOURNAL OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 10 (September, 1966), at 345.73lbid.
74 Johnson, Economic Policies, at 153.
75John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: Signet, 1968), at
41-42.76This notion is implicit in Wilson E. Schmidt, The Case Against Commodity Agree-
ments, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol. 28 (Spring, 1963), at 318- 19.
77Johnson, Economic Policies, at 38.78See Blau, UNCTAD PROCEEDINGS: COMMODITY TRADE, Vol. III, at 165.
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Conclusion
International commodity agreements have been looked down upon be-
cause they violate some of the most sacred tenets (Efficiency, in particular)
of the economic theorists. Free trade idealism, which began in Havana, is
strenuously maintained even by those who are otherwise sympathetic to
the trade predicament of the LDCs. Consequently, the scholars have
devoted little attention to possible ways of strengthening and expanding the
commodity agreement.
The thesis of this article is that while the ICA may not "solve" the
commodity trade problems facing the developing world, it does offer poten-
tially important contributions in a second-best situation. It may, for ex-
ample, hold protectionist tendencies in check while offering at least a
temporary barrier to a declining price trend. 79 As in the Coffee Agreement,
it may promote diversification. And even when agreements fail of adoption,
international consultative machinery provides a valuable forum for inter-
national review of market problems.80
If ICAs are useful instruments of trade policy they are worthy of
constructive review. Again referring to the Coffee Agreement, one may see
how sophisticated policy devices distinguish a modern ICA from a mere
cartel. The collective bargaining approach herein put forth is a modest
proposal for adding political strength to the LDCs and for making complex
negotiation somewhat easier. The problems of sanctions, commodity con-
trol mechanisms and negotiation techniques need more attention than they
have had in the past.
For until the rich countries act in support of their free trade rhetoric,
exporters will have to face and solve the problems of making commodity
agreements effective.8 1 At present, "a series of modest steps may be the
best tactic for improving the South's trade and aid receipts."'82
79See for example, Sir Sidney Caine, Commodity Agreements-A Nell, Look, LLOYDS
BANK REVIEW (January, 1963), at 23.
8 0Haviland, International Commodity Agreements, at 34.
8iPincus, Readings in International Economic Relations, at 463.82 Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, at 368.
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